

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.224
17 August 1965

ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U SAIN BWA

(Burma)

cdc.65-103

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.A. BEESLEY
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELIEKE
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. N. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the two hundred and twenty-fourth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): Before beginning my statement, in which I intend to express my delegation's point of view on the state of disarmament negotiations after a ten-month recess, to assess the task before this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in the light of the work achieved by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York and to state the general attitude of the United Arab Republic on a non-dissemination treaty, I should like first to thank Mr. Foster, the United States representative, for his kind gesture in ceding to me his place on the list of speakers.

Once again the delicate and difficult problem of disarmament is thrust upon the members of this Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is true that discussions and negotiations on disarmament have been going on almost continuously since the end of the Second World War. It cannot be denied that some progress has been made as a result of this process, nor can it be denied that the degree of such progress leaves much to be desired.

Arms and armaments systems are not created for their own sake: they are the result of existing conflicts among nations. That is why we deplore the deteriorating international atmosphere plagued by sources of tension, violence and aggression. This worsening political climate is no doubt delaying our negotiations, and that in its turn has an adverse impact on the prospects of peace which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been trying to promote during the last three years. This difficulty could be surmounted if we were to advance simultaneously on both lines -- the gradual settlement of political disputes, and the technical negotiations of disarmament. Any progress in one sphere would without doubt facilitate and initiate progress in the other and, moreover, would lead to the growth of international confidence.

The United Arab Republic, as a non-aligned country which believes in peace based on justice, considers that a realistic approach to the promotion of the cause of disarmament should be based on the solution of pending international crises which threaten to engulf us and the rest of the world in a devastating war. Therefore the

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

United Arab Republic would like to appeal to all parties concerned to heed the call of sanity and spare the small nations the sufferings and sacrifices they are enduring. Inasmuch as we cannot remain indifferent to the dangers to which this deteriorating situation is exposing the whole world, it should stimulate us to redouble the efforts made here to promote peace. We are encouraged in this respect by the fact that that is also what we understood from the declarations made by the two co-Chairmen at the opening meeting of this session (ENDC/PV.218).

The deliberations of our Committee in Geneva in 1964 came to an end on 17 September after sixty-one plenary meetings without in fact bringing the results expected by us all after the initial progress achieved the year before. The Conference had to break up without being able to present any concrete agreements to a world in which the arms race was still speeding up amid further uncertainties and increasing dangers.

During the Conference's first session of last year the Committee, in so far as general and complete disarmament was concerned, focussed its attention and held lengthy discussions on the problem of reducing and eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments -- items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agreed agenda (ENDC/52) -- in the light of the Soviet Government's amended and revised proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) providing for a nuclear umbrella to be kept as a deterrent until the end of the third stage of the disarmament process. During its second session there was a long and unsuccessful discussion about establishing a special working group whose task would be precisely to discuss the implications of a nuclear umbrella and the conditions under which it should be set up.

As the negotiations evolved in our Committee, it became more and more apparent that the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles had rightly become the very key to the deliberations on general and complete disarmament and a crucial element in the whole structure of the problem. Therefore the setting up of an appropriate working group with mutually-agreed terms of reference would seem to be the first practical step in launching a frontal attack on this vital and complex problem. It was on this point, unfortunately, that the negotiations got into a blind alley.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

If I have taken the time of the Committee in touching briefly upon the development of our deliberations vis-à-vis general and complete disarmament, it is because we still believe that the main mandate assigned to us by the General Assembly is to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control.

It was to our regret that, despite the encouraging atmosphere which prevailed in 1963, we were unable to register any kind of substantial result last year in the field of collateral measures. That was all the more regrettable since both the United States Government and the Soviet Government submitted to the Conference substantive proposals -- numbering fourteen altogether -- for collateral measures. All of them were amply discussed, but nevertheless at the end of the Conference last year no rapprochement or particular progress was recorded. In fact, the Committee's debate again left no doubt that the fundamental difference of opinion between East and West lies in the field of verification and control on the one side, and the geographical scope and political objective of the main disarmament proposals on the other.

Far from being deterred by these differences or difficulties, the non-aligned delegations brought to light and stressed the points of similarity in the proposals of both sides and the common objectives pursued by them. In response to the general directives of the General Assembly in this respect, the non-aligned delegations presented compromise solutions and suggestions to narrow the gap between the two parties' positions.

We had hoped that the debate within the framework of the General Assembly would provide us with fresh directives and open up new possibilities for agreement. Unfortunately our hopes for support and new stimulus from the larger forum soon disappeared when it became obvious that the General Assembly would not engage in effective work last session. In addition to the inherent difficulty of disarmament negotiations, critical political developments in the world affecting especially the small nations aggravated the situation, and the hopes of the peoples for a better understanding and a more secure world faded greatly because of the paralysis of the United Nations General Assembly and its inability to tackle the major international problems facing the world today, and in particular the disarmament problem.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Fortunately, this sombre situation was brightened somewhat by the reconvening of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York. The reconvening of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at this particular time shows beyond any doubt that the disarmament effort should continue without interruption until agreement on general and complete disarmament is reached.

After its two-month session, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted two resolutions (DC/224, 225; ENDC/149). Resolution DC/224 concerns the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited, as proposed (A/5763; p.23) by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964. We hope that the General Assembly at its twentieth session will give its support to that proposal. As we have stated on various occasions, it is our firm belief that more successful and useful deliberations on the vital problem of disarmament would undoubtedly be achieved through the participation of all States and in particular all the nuclear Powers, including the People's Republic of China and France.

The second resolution, DC/225, adopted by the Disarmament Commission urged an early reconvening of our Committee to continue its task both in the field of general and complete disarmament and in the field of collateral measures. My delegation has noted with satisfaction that this resolution, by including the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of the developing countries, reflects the necessity of narrowing the gap between the developing and the developed nations.

Before the adoption of these two resolutions a useful and thorough exchange of views was held in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and important aspects of disarmament were raised, among them the problems of denuclearized zones, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of foreign bases. With regard to the problem of foreign bases, the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-Aligned Countries has noted with concern that foreign military bases are

"... in practice a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas ...".

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

The Conference regarded further

"... the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops on the territories of other countries ... as a gross violation of the sovereignty of States, and as a threat to freedom and international peace." (A/5763, p.25)

As far as my delegation is concerned we are ready to discuss one or all of the collateral measures presented by both parties in order to continue to explore the possibility of reaching agreement on any of them. But since the importance and the urgency of reaching further agreement on specific issues collateral to disarmament varies in priority according to the development in the international situation, and since there are some specific collateral measures which hold out some prospects for agreement -- and it is for this reason that resolution DC/225 has recommended that we consider them as a matter of priority and report to the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the progress made in our work -- my delegation should like to deal with the two specific issues mentioned in resolution DC/225, which are underground tests and the problem of non-dissemination.

The question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover underground tests occupies an important part of our minds. It is quite obvious that unless underground tests are banned and halted completely we shall be undermining the partial test-ban Treaty; and the more we delay our action in this respect the more difficult it will become in the future to maintain the momentum gained so far by the disarmament cause. That is a situation which, I trust, no State represented here wishes to see arise.

We have listened with great attention to what both sides have had to say with regard to this problem in their speeches during this session. It is rather encouraging to notice that the gap between the two sides tends to narrow. I would refrain from elaborating the position of the United Arab Republic in this connexion, as it has been stated in this Committee and elsewhere in other forums of the United Nations (ENDC/PV.161, p.12; PV.182, pp.12 et seq.; A/C.1/PV.1310, p.28-30 of the provisional text; DC/PV.75, pp.47 et seq. of the provisional text). I should like to say at this stage that whatever the remaining differences are, political or technical, the Committee has before it various suggestions presented to it by the non-aligned delegations around this table, such as that for the extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, which the admitted

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

capacities and capabilities of the existing national equipments are able to detect and identify, as a further step towards the total banning of all underground tests (ENDC/144, p.33). As a complementary measure to the preceding one, we again proposed (DC/PV.75, p.51 of the provisional text) that there should be a voluntary moratorium by nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

As we have already mentioned, whatever the real obstacles may be, political or technical, we still believe as we have believed in the past that exchanging scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers, or continued improvement of detection and identification techniques, might help us to reach finally an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I should like to turn now to the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite obvious that recent developments in the world have pushed to the forefront the problem of the further spread of nuclear weapons and the danger of an increase in the number of countries which could produce or otherwise acquire them. The dangers inherent in this problem signify the necessity and urgency of reaching an agreement to prevent the possibility of enlarging the membership of the atomic club, and therefore of increasing the dangers of nuclear war which would lead to universal disaster.

It was with this sense of responsibility that the heads of African States and Governments who assembled in Cairo in July 1964 adopted their resolution on this issue which later was unanimously confirmed at the Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries when they convened for their second conference last October. As the Committee is aware, the Heads of State or Government declared their "readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons". They furthermore expressed their readiness to have this solemn undertaking made

"... the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations, and open to accession by all States." (A/5763, p.22)

They also called upon the nuclear Powers to observe and respect the spirit of this declaration.

Furthermore, the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, in their Programme for Peace and International Co-operation, requested

"... the great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them."

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

They also underlined "the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons" and urged "all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements ...". (ibid.)

We are ready, therefore, to discuss with great attention and interest any draft treaty on non-dissemination which will take into consideration in this respect the wishes and aspirations expressed by the Heads of the Non-Aligned States at their summit meeting held in Cairo last year.

We have expressed our views on the question of non-dissemination on many occasions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In general, our basic conception of a non-dissemination treaty is not of a mere instrument in which the non-nuclear Powers would gladly renounce their rights to acquire nuclear weapons in order just to perpetuate the monopoly or the privileged position of the present five nuclear Powers; we see the treaty as an important measure to curb and to reverse the nuclear arms race in order to facilitate the actual reduction and final destruction of the existing stocks of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Therefore we should like to see the treaty reflect this consideration in an appropriate way, and we sincerely hope it will do so.

I should like to refer to the message sent by President Nasser to the World Conference against Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Bombs held recently in Tokyo. In his message the President emphasized the threat of nuclear annihilation to which all peoples of the world are exposed. He further called upon all nations of the world to insist on the prohibition of all nuclear tests and of the possession of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. The President added that the United Arab Republic, for its part, strongly supported all endeavours directed against nuclear armaments. He voiced the hope that agreement would be reached on the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

We in the United Arab Republic have diligently worked for consolidation of the policy of peaceful coexistence and the promotion of the cause of peace based on justice. That is why we have always shown a keen interest in the cause of disarmament. Up to very recently the disarmament problem, and the question of non-dissemination in particular, has been among the main topics discussed by the United Arab Republic in the series of meetings which we have had with the Heads of African, Asian and other non-aligned countries who visited Cairo recently. As a result of these meetings we came to the conclusion that it was imperative now to conclude a

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

non-dissemination agreement. We therefore hope that discussion at this session will enable us to arrive at an acceptable non-dissemination agreement, and that all of us here will be able to sign the first draft of such a treaty and to submit it to the General Assembly at its forthcoming session.

Mr. CORREA do LAGO (Brazil) (translation from French): Before reading my statement I, too, should like to thank Mr. Foster for his kindness in allowing me to speak before him.

During the past few years, and especially at the recent session of the Disarmament Commission in New York, the Brazilian Government has maintained that the Eighteen-Nation Committee is the most appropriate body to deal with the problems of disarmament. It does not, of course, underestimate thereby the value of the discussions in the Disarmament Commission, but considers them encouraging. Moreover, the work accomplished in New York has brought out very clearly once again the universal extent of the vital interest which the problem of disarmament arouses among the peoples. Nevertheless it is in the Eighteen-Nation Committee that objective and practical efforts can be made towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

While rejoicing, therefore, that our Committee has resumed its work, I must admit that the Brazilian delegation would have wished that after three weeks of meetings we should have found ourselves engaged in discussing some proposals that would enable us to envisage positive measures. Nevertheless, as several previous speakers have reminded us, the Committee has terms of reference to comply with. Indeed, as regards our programme of work, we have responsibilities which have been precisely defined by resolution DC/225 of the Disarmament Commission (ENDC/149).

The statements made by the representatives of Sweden (ENDC/PV.222) and India (ENDC/PV.223) regarding the terms of that resolution make it unnecessary for us to dwell on that point. I should merely like to point out that the resolution requests us to accord special priority to the consideration of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover underground tests.

(Mr. Correa do Lago, Brazil)

Of course, my delegation would not wish to exclude consideration of any other question that would enable us to make progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, we are always mindful that, as resolution DC/225 recently reaffirmed, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should keep in mind in its work the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures. An initiative along these lines would go some way towards meeting the hopes which a large section of world public opinion places in this Conference and would certainly reinforce the machinery for the maintenance of peace envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

When the time comes, the Committee must not shirk that task, and I should like to say that it was with great satisfaction that the Brazilian delegation heard the very appropriate comments made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Fanfani, in that regard (ENDC/PV.219, p.19). We think, however, that the shortness of the time at our disposal and the various degrees of urgency of the subjects set before the Conference are circumstances which oblige us to give our attention more particularly to the questions of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons and banning underground nuclear tests. Moreover, in requesting us to report to the General Assembly during its twentieth session, the Disarmament Commission has shown implicitly that it likewise interprets the scope of its recommendation in that way.

It is also to be noted that statements which we have already heard here show that most delegations have chosen to bring precisely these two points to the fore. None of us is blind to the gravity of the problem posed by the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the Conference is being held at a time when we are facing a dissemination crisis, the danger of which to the maintenance of peace and to the human race has been stressed by many speakers without a single dissenting voice.

True to the support which it gave to General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), the Brazilian delegation hopes that the Committee will prove equal to its responsibilities, and we are prepared to join in any effort to resolve this problem. We regret that the unanimity which was shown on the need to make this effort has not yet been translated into unanimity of view, especially among the nuclear Powers, regarding the road to be taken.

(Mr. Correa do Lago, Brazil)

We look forward with the greatest interest to the draft treaty on which a group of delegations is now working, and would welcome with the same interest any other formulae or suggestions having the same object. Of course, we believe that such formulae should not regard non-dissemination as an end in itself but should take into account also the effective security of the non-nuclear Powers.

While it is necessary to put a stop to any increase in the membership of the nuclear club, the nuclear Powers themselves should undertake to reduce their atomic arsenal, and the non-proliferation measures proposed should take into account the needs of the developing countries in regard to economic and social progress. Hence our satisfaction at having heard here the representatives of the United States (ENDC/PV.218, pp.11 et seq.) and Canada (ENDC/PV.221, p.14) stress the importance they attach to the need to safeguard the security of nations which renounce nuclear weapons. Their statements give us reason to hope that this concern will be clearly reflected in the draft treaty on which they are working. Hence also the value which we attach to the contributions made by the delegations of Sweden (ENDC/PV.222, pp.13 et seq.) and India (ENDC/PV.223, pp.11 et seq.) to the analysis of these problems, in bringing out quite clearly, beside the duties which a non-dissemination treaty would impose upon the non-nuclear Powers, the paramount obligations which the nuclear Powers must assume for an agreement in this field to be equitable and valid. I am sure that the suggestion made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy (ENDC/PV.219, pp.18, 19) could prove to be a useful instrument in this range of ideas and merits careful study.

The other point to which we must accord special priority is that of converting into reality as soon as possible that part of the preamble of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) which looks forward to the abolition of underground nuclear tests. Here again it is a question of non-dissemination, but considered this time from the particular point of view of the phenomena which are its instrument.

Brazil has already declared, both in the Committee and in the General Assembly, that it neither admits the legitimacy of nuclear tests, which are always to be condemned, nor does it recognize the right of any Power to conduct them. It was in this spirit that at the end of last year's session we joined Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic in order to submit to the Conference the joint memorandum on a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/145).

(Mr. Correa do Lago, Brazil)

As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, have emphasized in their statements, we are convinced that the ending of these tests is at least as urgent as a treaty on non-dissemination. From the practical point of view it must also be noted that, in comparison with non-dissemination, the question of ending underground tests has already been the subject of much more advanced studies and that in this field the differences are less profound. The Committee will certainly remember that the delegation of Brazil had advocated (ENDC/PV.61, p.36; PV.71, p.16; A/PV.1208, pp.3 et seq.) the immediate prohibition, if not of all nuclear tests, at least of those which could be detected and identified by national control systems, a conviction borne out by the signing of the Moscow Treaty two years ago.

It still remains for us, however, to tackle the much more difficult question of completing this treaty by extending its scope to the only field which it does not cover, namely underground tests. We have listened with great attention to the statements which have been made on this subject and are inclined to believe that, despite the differences between the respective positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, the conclusion of at least a partial agreement is by no means out of the question.

In this regard I venture to recall especially that my delegation has on several occasions suggested the partial prohibition of underground tests as a logical consequence of the same criterion which, leaving aside the requirement of special control, made it possible to conclude the Moscow Treaty. My delegation urged this idea at the previous session of the Committee. What encourages us to revert to it today is that we have the impression that, if agreement were reached on the extent to which on-site inspection could be avoided, it would be possible to conclude a partial treaty to ban underground tests, taking into account both the position of the Soviet Union and that of the United States.

All the Powers, it seems to us, agree that technical means are already available which make it possible to identify any test above a certain threshold without having recourse to inspection. Moreover, the determination of this threshold would be facilitated both by the latest scientific progress in identifying earthquakes and by the fact that the exchange of technical data which it would require would be reduced to a minimum.

(Mr. Correa do Lago, Brazil)

We thus revert rather hopefully to this idea that a step forward could be made by the joint definition of a threshold above which all underground nuclear tests would be prohibited. We do not put forward this suggestion with the object of replacing the total prohibition of underground tests, which must remain the objective of our work; it should be regarded as an endeavour to arrive at least at an intermediate result, in case agreement to extend the Moscow Treaty to all tests cannot be reached here and now. However, an agreement in this field, whether limited in respect of a threshold or of general scope, would represent a concrete and practical demonstration of the desire of the nuclear Powers to contribute effectively to the security and peace of the world.

The delegation of Brazil looks forward to having other opportunities of speaking, as the discussions bring forward constructive proposals which can be studied in the Committee. We base this hope of fruitful negotiations on the fact that the very presence of the nuclear Powers at this meeting seems to prove their desire to direct the disarmament discussion into a positive path. This encourages us to hope for tangible results, and it is in that spirit that we would like to view this period of our work. We hope that the current session will become in every respect a significant step towards reducing international tensions and halting the arms race.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): In my opening statement (ENDC/PV.218, pp.9 et seq.) at this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament I read a message from President Johnson in which he assigned the following objective to be pursued by the United States delegation:

"First, to seek agreements that will limit the perilous spread of nuclear weapons, and make it possible for all countries to refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race." (ENDC/150)

After referring to the need to work towards the effective limitation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and for a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty, the President said also:

"No difference among any of us, on any other issue, can be allowed to bar agreement in this critical area. This is not in any single nation's interest, nor is it in the interest of the multitude of nations and peoples whose future is so tied to the good sense of those at this conference table."

(ibid.)

(Mr. Foster, United States)

It is in this spirit that I have the pleasure today of offering for discussion and negotiation in this Committee a draft treaty (ENDC/152) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This draft is the product of close collaboration among the NATO countries represented here. It embodies important contributions from Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom. Although the United States has the privilege and responsibility of sponsorship, our allies fully share our earnest desire that this text should be received by the Committee as a sincere and constructive basis for negotiation.

In the course of their intensive consultations the four Western delegations were motivated by the single desire to come to grips once and for all with the deadly peril of nuclear anarchy. We have been inspired by the spirit of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) whose unanimous call for an international agreement to bar the spread of nuclear weapons has gone too long unanswered. We have sought to respond as faithfully and as fully as now seems possible to the recommendation contained in document DC/225 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (ENDC/149), a resolution which enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations. Finally, we have sought to accommodate the differing and sometimes conflicting preoccupations of various governments in a manner which, while sensitive to their desires, gives the necessary emphasis to the need to halt proliferation.

Let me now offer a brief explanation of the provisions of the draft treaty.

Under article I countries having nuclear weapons would have the following obligations. First, they could not transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Secondly, they could not assist any such country in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, they could not take any other action to increase the number of nuclear Powers in the world. By "nuclear Powers" I mean any entity having independent power to use nuclear weapons, whether it be a State, a régime or some other kind of organization. As we all know, power to use nuclear weapons now rests only in national hands.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Article II of the treaty would impose corresponding obligations upon the countries not having nuclear weapons. First, these countries could not seek or receive the transfer of nuclear weapons into their national control. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Secondly, they could not manufacture nuclear weapons or seek, receive or grant assistance in such manufacture. Thirdly, they could not take any other action which would cause an increase in the number of nuclear entities in the world above the existing number. This simple draft would thus prevent any increase in the number of nuclear Powers. You will all remember President Kennedy's fear that there would be no rest for anyone, no stability, no real security and no chance for disarmament in a world with a growing number of nuclear Powers. This draft would ensure that there would be no increase in the number, even by one.

Under article III all parties would undertake to co-operate in facilitating the application to their peaceful nuclear activities of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or their equivalent. Unlike other provisions of this draft, this article does not set forth a precise or completely-formulated obligation; but it does clearly indicate a line of policy which all parties undertake to implement: namely, that they will help to bring about the application of such safeguards to their own peaceful nuclear activities and to those of other countries. It is implicit in their undertaking that they would work to see that this is done as rapidly as possible. A number of countries have begun to accept safeguards on their own peaceful reactors. We hope that this process can be expedited.

Moreover, countries which supply uranium and reactors can co-operate in facilitating the application of safeguards in other countries by insisting that this be done with respect to any material or equipment which they supply. I shall want to speak at greater length on this important question in a later intervention; but let me say now that the United States regards this as one of the key provisions which enunciates an important policy. And the application of adequate international safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities is not a matter which is of interest to the nuclear Powers alone. On the contrary, it is the non-nuclear Powers which should be especially interested in a system of safeguards to help assure each of them that their neighbours and others are in fact complying with the treaty.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We have drafted the provision in its present form to take account of the views of all countries, including those which are not prepared at this time to commit themselves to accept IAEA safeguards in all applicable circumstances. The United States will be especially interested to receive suggestions from the non-nuclear members of this Committee on means of strengthening this provision.

The next article, article IV, contains an important definition. It says that by using the phrase "nuclear State" in this draft treaty we mean a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of a particular date. Our view is that that date should be the day when the treaty is opened for signature. Our hope, of course, is that this would be very soon.

Article V is an accession clause quite similar to that in the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). It provides that the treaty will be open to all States for signature. We have suggested this clause because of our belief that the treaty should have world-wide application. The clause would not of course affect the recognition or status of any unrecognized régime or entity which might decide to file an instrument of accession to the treaty.

Under international law and practice recognition of a government or acknowledgement of the existence of a State is brought about as the result of a deliberate decision and course of conduct on the part of a government intending to accord recognition. Recognition of a régime or acknowledgement of an entity cannot be inferred from signature or ratification of or accession to a multilateral agreement. We believe this viewpoint is generally accepted, and it is on that basis that we have suggested this clause.

One important change in this draft from the limited test-ban Treaty language is that paragraph 3 of article V explicitly recognizes the importance of obtaining wide adherence to the treaty if it is to be effective in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It does this by requiring adherence by a certain number of governments before the treaty goes into effect. We have left a blank for that number. In our view the number should be sufficiently high so that the treaty will be a significant anti-proliferation measure, but not so high as unduly to delay its entry into force.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Article VI is a withdrawal clause fashioned after the provision in the limited test-ban Treaty. It contains two important additions to that provision. First, a party wishing to withdraw under the limited conditions set forth must give notice three months in advance to the Security Council of the United Nations as well as to other parties to and signatories of the treaty. This notice must include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. These requirements have been added because they provide an additional brake on hasty withdrawal action without limiting the basic right of withdrawal. In addition, Security Council notification and explanation are clearly appropriate in view of the serious security ramifications of withdrawal.

The second addition to the limited test-ban Treaty formula is a provision calling for review of the treaty, after a specified period, with the agreement of two-thirds of the parties. This was included in part because of the wide concern recently expressed by many participants in the discussions here and in the Disarmament Commission that a treaty such as this should be accompanied by progress to halt and reduce rising nuclear stocks. One of the preambular paragraphs explicitly recognizes this concern. It calls attention to the desire of all of us --

"... to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals".

The United States has proposed a number of measures to stop the build-up of and to reduce nuclear stockpiles. We are prepared to agree to them even before a treaty such as we have tabled today is signed. But we do not believe they should wait on this treaty or that this treaty should wait on them. Let us proceed on all such proposals at the same time, making progress wherever we can.

The last article of the draft treaty, article VII, deals with the problem of authentic texts. It adds Chinese, French and Spanish to the languages set forth in the corresponding clause of the limited test-ban Treaty. This change has been made to signify once again our desire for world-wide adherence.

The draft treaty I have just described may not be a perfect instrument, nor is it necessarily complete in its coverage of pertinent issues. We earnestly hope, however, that our discussion will focus on such improvements as can be agreed upon and that we shall not be urged to incorporate elements which, however desirable in

(Mr. Foster, United States)

theory, are not now attainable. Insistence on such an approach would be a sure way to prevent agreement. We also hope that our discussions will not be rendered pointless by the imposition of unnecessary conditions or demands from any quarter.

As I said in an earlier intervention, the danger of proliferation is world-wide. It is not the special concern of any one country; nor can it be averted by concentrating our attention on any one country. Let us examine this draft, therefore, from the standpoint of our common goal. If our common goal is to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing the security of all nations, then that and that alone must govern our arguments. Any other approach would be a monumental folly for which we and future generations would pay dearly and for which we should deserve the condemnation of mankind.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): We have listened with all due attention to the statements made this morning and at previous meetings, and my delegation intends to study them carefully.

At this stage in our work the Romanian delegation wishes only to outline its position of principle in regard to the problems we are called upon to examine. These problems -- and it seems advisable to make this clear from the start, since certain differences of opinion have become apparent in this respect -- must all be in line with the essential task which has been entrusted to our Committee: namely, the preparation of a disarmament treaty.

I wished particularly to recall this, since the work of this session has brought out in a very striking manner the need for all States to promote the cause of disarmament. It goes without saying that this imposes on all of us an obligation to refrain from anything that might be detrimental to that cause and to the negotiations relating thereto, an obligation not to undertake any action that might envenom or worsen international relations or increase international tension -- in a word, make disarmament negotiations more difficult.

It was quite right, of course, during the previous sessions to dwell on the more favourable conditions for the conduct of our negotiations here in this Committee, around this table, which has been appropriately compared to a seismograph extremely sensitive to everything that happens in the world. If my memory serves me well, all

the delegations present here, without any exception, have stressed the importance of a détente in international relations, the creation of a favourable atmosphere and the normalization of relations between States.

Therefore it seems to me to be quite normal -- nay more, to be our duty -- to dwell on the fact that during the interval that has elapsed since the end of our last session, and despite the fact that the United Nations Disarmament Commission was in session, disturbing events have occurred which have caused the international situation to deteriorate. The Romanian delegation believes that **this** Committee cannot remain indifferent while outside the Committee actions are being taken in a direction diametrically opposed to the goal towards which our work should be directed.

What constitutes the very essence of the question of disarmament, as it arises in our time, is incontrovertibly the existence, the unprecedented destructive power and the ever-increasing number of nuclear weapons. As long as the nuclear danger exists, it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve international peace and security. I hasten to emphasize that all peoples, great and small, and consequently all States without exception or distinction whatsoever, have equal rights and should therefore enjoy in an equal manner the right to peace and security.

That is why the Romanian delegation, like many other delegations, has always advocated measures designed to ensure security for all by putting an end to the nuclear danger for ever. From this point of view it seems that, although differences continue to exist as to the ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons, on the other hand, there should no longer be any difficulty in regard to prohibiting their use.

Indeed, the need to ban the use of nuclear weapons has long been recognized. In the resolution entitled "Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons" (A/RES/1653(XVI)) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1961, it is categorically stated that --

"The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

"The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;

"Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization;". This declaration, against which, it is true, the Western Powers voted, gives expression to the sense of law and justice, to the imperatives of the international ethics of all the peoples of the world, and to their aspirations for security.

The Soviet Union, as everyone knows, advocates the general prohibition and total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The People's Republic of China also advocates the general prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, not only the two socialist nuclear Powers but all the socialist countries advocate these essential measures. Many countries, members or non-members of this Committee, support these measures. It rests therefore entirely with the Western Powers to give effect to resolution 1653(XVI) of the United Nations General Assembly which I have just quoted and to achieve, as a first step, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and, in the first place, an undertaking not to be the first to use them. Once this prohibition has been proclaimed and an undertaking to destroy nuclear weapons has been assumed a new situation will be created, a situation propitious both for the adoption and implementation of all other disarmament measures and for peaceful international co-operation.

It is for these reasons that the Romanian Government supports the proposal formulated in 1961 by the Government of Ethiopia (ibid.) to convene an international conference to prepare a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons. We support the proposal made on 10 October 1964 by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries for the convening of a world conference on disarmament (A/5763, pp. 23, 24). We are also in favour of the proposal made on 16 October 1964 by the Government of the People's Republic of China to convene a summit conference for the purpose of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons and, as a first step towards that goal, prohibiting their use.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

We are in favour of any agreement relating to disarmament that would ensure respect for the equality of rights, sovereignty, independence and security of all States. Of course, one cannot overlook the fact that the effectiveness of disarmament agreements depends upon the participation of all States, and more particularly that of the great Powers -- nuclear Powers -- including the People's Republic of China and France.

It is from this angle that the Romanian delegation intends to study all the problems which we are called upon to consider, whether they be questions of disarmament properly speaking or collateral measures. Of course, we cannot go into details today. My delegation proposes to do so in due course. Nevertheless, I do not think I shall be breaking my self-imposed rule for today, to confine myself to stating the position of principle of my delegation, if I dwell briefly on the proposal for the elimination of military bases and the withdrawal of all armed forces stationed on foreign territories.

The existence of foreign military bases and of troops stationed on the territories of other States -- which are just so many instruments of political intervention in the internal affairs of other countries -- has a negative effect on international relations. The events which have taken place in the Congo, in the Dominican Republic and above all in Vietnam once again confirm the magnitude of the danger to the peace and security of the peoples which those bases and the presence of foreign armies on the territories of other countries involve.

With your permission, I should like in this connexion to quote from the statement of the Romanian Government published on 13 August certain passages which are of interest in this context:

"Public opinion in our country has learnt with deep concern and disapproval of the new measures designed to extend the military intervention of American imperialism against the Vietnamese people. The decision of the United States Government to increase the strength of its armed forces in Vietnam by 50,000 men constitutes an act of

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

aggravation of the war in Vietnam, causes peace in South-East Asia to incur greater dangers, and constitutes a source of new threats to all peoples and to general peace and security.

"In committing these aggressive acts, the United States Government takes upon itself a new and heavy responsibility.

"The despatch of further intervention troops, like the stepping-up of bombardments of the towns and villages of North Vietnam, shows that despite its statements of peaceful intentions the United States, trampling on the elementary rules of internal law, is openly intensifying the war against an independent and sovereign State -- the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- and against the Vietnamese people, who are defending their freedom and their sacred and inalienable right to decide their own destiny.

"The Government of the People's Republic of Romania, voicing the thoughts and feelings of its whole people, condemns in the most determined way these aggressive acts on the basis of the principle that every people has the right to decide freely its own destiny without any intervention from outside. Our people express once again, very firmly, their solidarity with and full support for the Vietnamese people in their just struggle, and firmly support the declaration of 2 August 1965 by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

"The programme set forth by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam -- the only lawful representative of the people of that part of Vietnam -- shows the way to the solution of the Vietnamese problem.

"As it has emphasized on several occasions, the Government of the People's Republic of Romania considers it urgently necessary that the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 should be carried out; that the aerial bombardments and all violations of the sovereignty and

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should cease; that the war of aggression in South Vietnam should be brought to an end; that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Vietnam, and that the Vietnamese people should be left free to settle their internal affairs themselves in conformity with their own interest and their own will."

In the interest of the consolidation of peace and the elimination of any form of interference in the internal affairs of peoples, the Romanian delegation considers that the proposals for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed on the territories of other States are of a particularly urgent nature. The elimination of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed on the territories of other countries to within their own national confines are an indispensable condition for the maintenance of the peace and security of all the peoples of the world, a fundamental condition for the success of the cause of disarmament, and a desideratum cherished by all countries that love peace and freedom.

May I be allowed in this connexion to recall, among others, the declaration adopted at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo from 5-10 October 1964, in which Burma, Ethiopia, India, the United Arab Republic and Mexico also participated? That declaration emphasizes very firmly the need to eliminate military bases situated on foreign territory:

"Noting with concern that foreign military bases are in practice a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas, the Conference declares its full support to the countries which are seeking to secure the evacuation of foreign bases on their territory and calls upon all States maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them forthwith." (A/5763, p. 25)

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

Thus the declaration of the Cairo Conference is in line with the struggle of the recently-liberated peoples for the defence and consolidation of their national sovereignty and their independence as States, which was the idea underlying the declaration adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. These declarations emphasize with firmness the need to eliminate military bases situated on foreign territories. It is common knowledge that our Committee has had before it for a long time proposals designed to achieve that end. There is no need to demonstrate the beneficial effects which their implementation would have had.

What I should like to emphasize today is that, in view of the present circumstances, we cannot approach the problems of disarmament in a realistic way without tackling thoroughly the problem of military bases and armed forces located on foreign territories. That is why the Romanian delegation considers it essential that this important question, which is extremely urgent at the present time and is certainly on our agenda, should be examined in all earnest at this session.

Our delegation wishes to reaffirm the unwavering position of Romania in regard to the usefulness for the cause of peace and general security of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, with strict respect for the interests of the States concerned and for the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The interest which our country takes in this problem is also reflected in the well-known initiatives undertaken by Romania in 1957 and 1959, which are just as timely today -- initiatives which aimed at transforming the Balkans, formerly the powder-keg of Europe, into a zone of peace and co-operation between peoples (ENDC/PV.159, p.8; PV.168, p.16).

Our country is resolutely in favour of eliminating all military blocs. Life itself proves that the division of the world into military blocs increases international tension and fosters mistrust between States, the aggressive pacts of NATO, SEATO and CENTO bearing within themselves and promoting tendencies towards the domination of other peoples.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has made known through its Statement of 9 August (ENDC/151) its position in regard to several important problems

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

relating to disarmament. In that document, with which we are all acquainted, there are recalled the proposals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic for the renunciation by the two German States of the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons as well as obtaining control of them in any form, and an agreement on a cessation of armaments. We consider that that document should be examined with all due attention.

In intimating how it intends to study the difficult and complex problems of disarmament, the Romanian delegation notes with satisfaction that some of the ideas by which it is inspired and some of those brought forward by many other delegations, both during the recent session of the Disarmament Commission and within the scope of our work here, have a tendency to meet. In accordance with the instructions of its Government, the Romanian delegation, being determined to contribute as far as it can to the success of our work, will study with the greatest attention all proposals and initiatives submitted to our Committee and will give its full support to any idea likely to promote our progress along the road to disarmament.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico)(translation from Spanish): My delegation would like, first of all, to express its satisfaction that a draft treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152) has just been submitted at this meeting by the representative of the United States on behalf of his own delegation and of other Western delegations. Whatever views may be expressed about it, a working paper is always a step forward because it enables us to focus our attention on a concrete text and thus to speed up negotiations. My delegation will submit this document to its Government without delay, and in due course we shall state our views upon it in accordance with whatever instructions we receive from our Foreign Office. Since obviously we have only been able to glance at the document, I shall refrain from commenting upon it now, but if I may be permitted, I shall go on to read out the statement which I had prepared for this meeting.

Two, and only two, roads are today open to mankind: one leading to peace on the only possible basis, general and complete disarmament, the other continuing the present arms race and leading straight to destruction or, to be altogether precise, to annihilation.

As this is undeniably evident to us, the voice of Mexico cannot remain silent whenever such a grave, immense and urgent question comes up in any forum in which Mexico is represented. President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico has stated:

"We are supporters of disarmament, beginning with denuclearization, because we are convinced that either the world must put an end to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons will put an end to the world."

We realize very well that the present circumstances, and especially the vertiginous escalation of military operations in the most dangerous geographical areas, certainly do not provide the climate of moderation and cordiality which international negotiations normally require. It seems to us, however, that not even in the midst of the hurricane can we resign ourselves to catastrophe without first summoning all our energies in a supreme effort to carry out the task of ensuring the salvation or survival of the human race -- that statement is not in the least rhetorical -- a task which has been entrusted to us, the countries represented here, by the United Nations.

The mind staggers at the thought of what such a great responsibility implies; but it is precisely in human conditions that the response is often in direct proportion to the magnitude of the challenge. It is in this spirit that the Mexican delegation wishes to make its contribution to the solution of the difficult questions which the Disarmament Commission, or, properly speaking -- since the Commission is a plenary body -- practically the entire membership of the United Nations, has instructed us to study. We make this reservation solely for the sake of complete accuracy, for, as all the members of the Committee know, there was exactly one vote against resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149), which defines our terms of reference and therefore represents the manifest will of the international community. For our part, we do not see how we can evade directives that are backed by the highest conceivable political authority.

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

The time at our disposal is exceedingly short in view of the magnitude of the task; but we can take a few steps forward, or one at least, by studying and discussing some preliminary draft or even a working paper, unless we wish to go back to the General Assembly empty-handed, thus deferring, if not actually frustrating, the hope of the peoples of the world, a hope which we must continue to encourage and for which we are responsible.

If it is not possible for us to agree here and now on any specific measure among those relating directly to what is still our ultimate goal, namely, general and complete disarmament, at least let us concentrate our attention and strive to expend all our effort for conciliation on a study of collateral measures which would reduce international tension and put an end to the arms race. Among such measures, the aforesaid resolution of the United Nations Disarmament Commission gives absolute priority to the following two points: the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to the physical environment not yet covered by the Treaty: namely, underground tests, and secondly-- and this, of course, follows from the first point -- the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"Proliferation" -- what a horrible word that is when, instead of being applied to the sacred environment to which alone it should refer -- the proliferation of life -- it is used to designate the proliferation of death! For that is exactly what we mean, no more and no less: the execrable fecundity of death, for there can be no other purpose or objective of the increase in the warlike nuclear potential of those countries which already enjoy this fateful privilege, and then the accession of other countries to what is called the "nuclear club". Those two things constitute the new terror of contemporary man, whose daily life is literally slithering on the edge of the abyss. When he thought he had become accustomed to the balance of terror -- and, however incredible it may seem, there were people who even advocated that balance of terror -- it turned out that, as new nuclear Powers appear, he has to face something much worse, the imbalance of terror, which is tantamount to terror pure and simple without any counter-weight, either strategic or merely emotional.

In speaking of the twofold aspect of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as I did just now, I should like to make it clear that, as far as we are concerned, the phenomenon is not adequately described if we speak only of spatial proliferation, from one country to another, from one frontier to another, by direct or indirect transfer of possession, control or handling of nuclear weapons. Besides this extraspatial proliferation, there is intraspatial proliferation, that is the progressive manufacture of nuclear weapons within the countries which already have them, because that, too, is proliferation of the harmful brood whose progenitor appeared, two decades ago, in the sky and over the people of Hiroshima.

The resolution of the Disarmament Commission under which we have convened here does not restrict the concept of proliferation to the first of these two aspects; consequently the facts force us to take both aspects into account. Therefore, in an ideal, or simply adequate, treaty on non-dissemination, it will be necessary to prohibit not only outside proliferation, that is beyond political frontiers, but also, and with the same energy, internal proliferation, first by freezing and then reducing the manufacture of fissionable material for warlike purposes.

Just as the control of epidemics usually starts by isolating the source of infection before attacking the disease at its root, we feel that here too it would be a good beginning to eliminate in the first place extraspatial proliferation by preventing the spread to other countries of ownership, control and access to nuclear weapons by means of reciprocal undertakings which would be respected by both the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers. I would stress that this would be a beginning, not an end: but it was not for nothing that the ancients used to say that well begun is half done.

It is also commonly said that the good is often the enemy of the best, which all comes to the same thing -- that is, that one has to start with something practicable, even if it is not the best, before tackling work of wider scope. Consequently, if we adopt this point of view -- which is not a strategic but merely a tactical one -- I would venture to disagree with the representative of India,

according to whom, if I understand him correctly, it would be necessary for the nuclear Powers to cease production of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles and agree to initiate a programme for the reduction of their existing nuclear stockpiles in the very first stage of a non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/PV.223,p.18).

I repeat that we fully agree that these measures should be accepted and implemented as soon as possible; but a delay, however regrettable, should not in our opinion constitute an insuperable obstacle to the conclusion of a preliminary agreement on non-proliferation.

Consequently we consider more realistic the suggestion made here by the Italian Foreign Minister to the effect that, if it proved impossible to draw up within a reasonable time a draft treaty which would also include correlative obligations for the nuclear Powers, then, and only then, the non-nuclear countries might accept a sort of moratorium which Mr. Fanfani himself described as follows:

"It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries, particularly those close to nuclear capability, might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their aforementioned demands were not complied with during that time-limit, they would resume their freedom of action." (ENDC/PV.219, pp. 18, 19)

It follows quite clearly from the preceding paragraphs that by "demands" the distinguished statesman whom I have just quoted meant a system of guarantees which the nuclear Powers would have to offer as a necessary counterpart, and finally their own "nuclear disarmament", as Mr. Fanfani indicated in precise terms when he concluded his remarks as follows:

"In that way a respite would be given to the anxiety about nuclear dissemination and, moreover, a factor of pressure and persuasion would be created which would be brought to bear on the nuclear countries in order to spur them to conclude a general agreement, thus speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament. Thus a message of peace and good will could be given to the world, a message to which no one -- it is to be hoped -- could remain insensible." (ibid., p. 19)

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

It is in a similar way, it seems to us, that we in Mexico and Latin America understand the stages of this regressive process -- sit venia verbo, because it is a regression towards good -- of non-proliferation, the first step in which was envisaged by us in the form of "denuclearization," first of our own territory and then later, but as part of the same impulse, of the countries to which Mexico feels itself most closely bound by a feeling of common origin and destiny.

To be even more specific, for us the stages I refer to would be -- or rather are -- the following: the unilateral decision, taken individually or collectively; the treaty between the non-nuclear countries of the Latin-American community -- all **without** exception are non-nuclear countries at present -- and concurrently, the recognition by the nuclear Powers of the legal status or condition which we would have given ourselves in this regard.

First of all, as regards the unilateral decision, may I quote very briefly, in order not to try your patience, what was said in this Committee during the meeting at the ministerial level on 22 March 1962 by the then Foreign Minister of my country:

"In our view, pending the attainment of world-wide agreement, denuclearization could, can and should be brought about through voluntary and free decisions by States. Thus, the Mexican Government has resolved neither to possess nor to admit to its national territory nuclear weapons of any sort or any vehicles that might be used for their delivery." (ENDC/PV.7, p. 8)

As we can see, this is a categorical decision, taken independently of any guarantee that might eventually support it. It is a decision which Mexico took by itself, in the exclusive exercise of its own sovereignty, and which it has maintained up to now in all its terms. For us, too, nuclear weapons are an intrinsic evil, as the representative of India said in similar terms (ENDC/PV.223, p.9), and we intend to remain immune from that evil. Consequently, in the United Nations General Assembly we voted in favour of resolution 1653 (XVI), which solemnly declares that:

"The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;".

And the resolution adds, as if what I have just read were not enough, that any State using this type of weapon is --

"... acting contrary to the laws of humanity and ... committing a crime against mankind and civilization;".

Only recently Pope Paul VI called this an atrocity against civilization. He could not have been more explicit. He said:

"We who so many times and in so many ways have asked for the prohibition of atomic weapons ... have also called for the proscription of this terrible art which enables them to be manufactured, multiplied and maintained to the fear of all peoples." (L'osservatore Romano, 9 - 10 August 1965)

The next step -- that of raising to the category of an international treaty the unilateral undertaking not to possess or to admit these arms -- was also taken by Mexico, when it began negotiations with the Latin-American countries which had submitted to the United Nations a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312) having the same object: the denuclearization of Latin America. As a result of these negotiations, which were quickly crowned with success through the co-operation of the other sister republics; the Heads of State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico issued on 29 April 1963 the "Declaration on the Denuclearization of Latin America", which is open to accession by all other Latin-American republics and from which it is sufficient to quote the first operative paragraph:

"To announce forthwith that their Governments are prepared to sign a Latin-American multilateral agreement by which the countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices;"(ENDC/87)

Thus, not only production or control but also the mere acceptance or stockpiling -- not to speak of handling, and irrespective of which State exercises control -- likewise constitutes for us a form of proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to the definition given at the preliminary meeting held in Mexico in

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

November 1964, at which almost all the Latin-American republics were represented, the term "denuclearization" means "the absence of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles"; in other words, these weapons and carriers are banned for all time in Latin America, irrespective of the State controlling them.

Of course we do not seek to impose these views on the rest of the international community. We are merely complying with the terms of reference contained in Resolution I of the Final Act of the Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America, according to which:

"The Latin-American representatives on the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee which is meeting in Geneva will maintain liaison between the Working Group and the Committee concerning such aspects of the Group's work as make it desirable."

Since we are now reviewing all these ideas here, the Mexican delegation considers it "desirable" to bring to this Committee's attention the meaning which in Latin America, we give to this concept of "denuclearization", and consequently the other idea closely related to it: proliferation. Indeed, the first of these ideas expresses rather the passive aspect, whereas the second expresses the active aspect of an undertaking, on the one hand not to transfer, and on the other hand not to receive, nuclear weapons.

I am very happy to be able to inform you now that the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America, which is the body in which we have institutionalized what might be called the Latin-American operation, is well advanced at the present time. As I presume that it will be of interest to everybody, I think I may be allowed to give a brief survey of the way in which this work is being carried out.

At its first meeting, which was held in Mexico in March 1965, the Preparatory Committee agreed to divide its work among three working parties or groups, A, B, and C, with the following terms of reference:

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

Group A, with headquarters in New York -- that is at the Headquarters of the United Nations -- is responsible, in the first place, for determining the geographical limits of the zone to which the denuclearization treaty shall apply; to that end it is responsible, in the second place, for taking action to obtain the agreement of all the sovereign States within that zone, and also the agreement of the extra-continental or continental States which, de jure or de facto, bear international responsibility for territories which may be included within the limits of the geographical zone in question. As we read in the Final Act of the meeting in Mexico, the precise purpose of these measures is that these States should --

"... agree to assume, with respect to such territories, the same contractual obligations assumed by the Republics and States mentioned above with respect to their own respective territories."

This, of course, refers to the Latin-American Republics and sovereign States included in the denuclearized zone.

Group B, with headquarters in Mexico, is responsible for carrying out the necessary studies of methods of verification, inspection and control which it may be considered appropriate to adopt in order to ensure faithful compliance with the obligations laid down in the treaty.

Lastly, Group C, with headquarters in New York, like Group A, will be responsible, as the Final Act states, for carrying out --

"... the necessary measures to obtain from the nuclear Powers the undertaking to respect scrupulously, in all its aspects and consequences, the legal status of the denuclearization of Latin America."

This time the reference is, as you see, to all nuclear Powers without exception and not only to those which might have territorial interests in the denuclearized zone. We ask them only to respect the status which we are conferring freely upon ourselves by our own sovereign decision, and to do nothing that would be likely to alter that status. This alone would be enough to enable us to reach our goals, without the need for any foreign support or interference. On occasion we have asked the United Nations Secretariat for technical assistance, but for the rest we consider this to be a matter to be settled exclusively within the regional sphere without the slightest interference by other bodies that may pursue similar objectives on a world-wide scale.

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

Very shortly, on 23 August to be precise, the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee on the Denuclearization of Latin America will take place in Mexico. At that meeting the respective working groups will report on their activities in order to co-ordinate the results of their work, and we have every reason to expect excellent results and decisive progress towards our ultimate goal if not the achievement of that goal itself.

Coming back to the question of non-proliferation on the world-wide scale, a problem which is under study in this Committee, the Mexican delegation profoundly regrets that up to the present time there still persists, solid as a rock, what appears to be the greatest obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement among the great nuclear Powers. I refer to the plans for a multilateral nuclear force -- or plans with similar names -- advocated by various countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We cannot fail to note this, simply because we are not deaf and our ears still ring with the arguments put forward on both sides. Hence -- and this is the decisive consideration -- we believe that the strictest duty of the non-aligned States members of this Committee is to endeavour to bring the parties to this dispute closer together, as far as humanly possible.

As we said last year, and we repeat it now with equal emphasis, we have the same respect for the positions of both sides, and we realize that for one group its security can be just as important as is for the other the need to maintain the integrity of the coalition to which it has belonged ever since the cold war unfortunately made necessary the formation of antagonistic blocs or alliances.

For the same reason, or precisely as a result of this situation, we think that the final solution of this thorny problem will ultimately have to come from a political decision taken by both sides; for it is essentially a political question. This being so, we think there would be very little use in having a theoretical discussion, which would perhaps be more appropriate to an academy or a university chair, on the precise meaning of such words as "proliferation" or "dissemination". At the biological or natural level it is easy up to a certain point to describe the phenomenon, because it is provided by nature itself, independently of the judgement of man; but this is no longer true when we are dealing with a practical metaphor, when we apply the terminology of nature to processes or acts which are essentially human.

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

It is then that a great many difficulties arise which defy any conceptual clarification. Who could say with apodictic precision whether beyond "possession" and "control", which appear to be the least questionable manifestations of proliferation, the same does not apply to "access" and "handling"? And even in regard to the first two notions, dialectics are used immediately, without any effort, to distinguish between original and precarious holding, or between individual and shared control, simply because it is once again not a question of natural data but of human, and therefore conventional, definitions, according to the old antithesis between nature and convention.

In principle, the best way would be to make a clean sweep and eliminate everything, both what is certain and what is doubtful. This is exactly what we are doing in Latin America, where, according to the texts I have quoted, there will simply be an "absence" of nuclear weapons and devices. "Absence" is certainly as clear a concept as "nothing" or a "vacuum"; and our regional community, absolutely devoid of atomic weapons, will reproduce over against the atomic community a dichotomy as clear-cut as that with which Democritus first saw the universe: atoms and vacuum.

But we do not claim that what is good for ourselves is good for everybody. We realize perfectly well that in other continents the situation is much more complex than in our own, which is not necessarily happy but is less bedevilled than others by centuries-old rancours. We respect other possible solutions and will examine them with all the members of the Committee whenever they are proposed in good faith with a complete lack of bias; because in order to settle difficulties, as I have tried to demonstrate, there is no dialectical arbitration tribunal which can say who is right on the sole basis of concepts.

On the other hand, there might, if the need arises, be a case for a legal authority, especially if a treaty on proliferation were to be concluded, since the function of the International Court of Justice is primarily to interpret international treaties. In the event of a dispute or simply to ask for an advisory opinion, the Court could be asked for a ruling whether a particular operation violated some clause in a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and a provision making recourse to the Court compulsory, should the occasion arise, might even be included in the treaty itself.

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

However preponderant the political aspect may be in this question, as we have recognized, we do not see why one should disregard the legal aspect, law and legal authority, because we do not accept the cynical maxim inter arma leges silent, even, or with all the more reason on the contrary, when nuclear weapons are concerned. I should like to make it quite clear that we are not making a formal proposal, but merely a suggestion which we put forward in all sincerity without any presumption, for consideration by all the members of the Committee.

Turning to the second question, of equal priority, that of extending the partial test-ban treaty to all environments, I shall confine myself to restating my delegation's well-known position: that we consider that the conclusion of such a treaty cannot on any account be postponed. As I have said before, there is clearly a close connexion between these two questions which the Disarmament Commission has referred to us, because the continuance of nuclear tests in any environment whatsoever is an indisputable form of proliferation, namely internal or domestic, and through the diffusion which all super-abundance tends to produce, external or international proliferation will inevitably come about.

Many other questions, all of them relating to disarmament, could of course be dealt with here, but I thought it advisable to confine myself today to those which represent both our greatest duty and the greatest anxiety of mankind. Until we completely abolish the evil of our century -- atomic weapons -- let us do everything possible to stop their increase and proliferation once and for all. As has been said here, let us reflect that one day the peoples of the world will grow weary of seeing us engaged in endless discussions without any redeeming solution emerging from the torrent of words. Do not let Geneva, this fine city of international co-operation, become what, in another context, the representative of Brazil said about New York, the cemetery of human hopes.

We still have a propitious moment and an opportunity to save the situation; but perhaps this will soon be no longer the case: therefore let us not allow this opportunity to escape us, because it might elude us for ever.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened attentively to the statement made today by the United States representative. We shall, of course, study his statement carefully.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, since a proper solution of this problem can help towards a definite limitation of the possibility of a nuclear missile war breaking out. It goes without saying that this can be achieved only if in the very near future a stop is put to access to nuclear weapons in any form, whether direct, that is through national ownership, national control or disposal, or indirect, that is access by non-nuclear States to nuclear weapons in one form or another within the framework of the NATO military bloc.

In this connexion we should like to have a clear reply from the United States representative to the question: does the draft treaty tabled today by the United States representative (ENDC/152) provide for the complete and unconditional prohibition of access to nuclear weapons, whether in a direct way, that is through national ownership, control or disposal, or in an indirect way, that is access to nuclear weapons through a so-called NATO multilateral force and such like? In other words, are we to understand the United States draft as precluding any possibility of the establishment of a NATO multilateral or similar force with the participation, in one form or another, of military or other personnel of the Federal Republic of Germany?

A clear reply by the United States representative to this question will enable us to understand in the proper light the proposal which he has tabled today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 224th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of U Sain Bwa, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Brazil, the United States, Romania, Mexico and the Soviet Union.

"The delegation of the United States of America tabled a Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.